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Rabbit, Run and Paul Ricoeur’s Interpretation of 
Atheism
Rick Severson
There is this quality, in things, o f the right way seeming wrong at first. To test our
faith.
—John Updike, Rabbit, Run1
W h a t e v e r  H a p p e n e d  T o  Jack Eccles? Remember him? He was the 
broad-minded Episcopal minister who attempted to guide Harry 
“Rabbit” Angstrom’s spiritual calisthenics in Rabbit, Run. Rabbit, the 
self-regarding ex-jock, crosses paths with Eccles after he dumps his 
wife Janice. As the pastor of Janice’s family, Eccles agrees to have a 
chat with Rabbit. Their first meeting inspires mutual curiosity, which 
leads to further talks. The book develops around the unfolding of 
their relationship. With the dedication of a m artyr—a martyr to liberal 
empathy and understanding, or to social gospel realism—Eccles pins 
his highest ministerial hopes on his ability to redeem, that is, reform, 
Rabbit. Rabbit, of course, is flattered by the attention. It is reminiscent 
of his basketball days. So why does Eccles disappear from John 
Updike’s Rabbit series without a trace? After all, even Peggy Fosnacht, 
a neighbor Rabbit casually seduces, merits return in Rabbit Redux and 
Rabbit is Rich.
I want to offer an interpretation of Rabbit, Run that makes sense of 
Eccles’s disappearance. The crux of my reading revolves around the 
suggestion that Rabbit, Run is an allegory of the death of God. Unlike 
the symbolism that points to heaven in Bunyan’s The Pilgrim's Progress, 
Updike’s figurative world is unconventionally earthbound. Rabbit’s 
pilgrimage is a rediscovery of his instinctive or animal self, with harsh 
consequences. One of his human instincts, perhaps the most danger­
ous one (as Rabbit ascertains with Eccles’s help), is his penchant for 
fleeing to God. “It’s the strange thing about you mystics,” Eccles 
remarks with this-worldly wisdom, “how often your little ecstasies 
wear a skirt” (p. 121). Rabbit’s attempts to overcome irresponsibility
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are struggles against heaven. If he can exorcise his native instinct for 
Grace, he will have faced up to reality. The end to Rabbit’s childish­
ness begins to appear with his devastating insight that there is no God, 
and that it is possible to lose life (pp. 184-86). Eccles disappears with 
the pilgrim genre, and the Rabbit that reappears in Rabbit Redux is 
secular.
With God’s death the pilgrim’s journey ends forever, and the 
narrative form of finding oneself in finding God, especially with the 
help of a spiritual guide, becomes meaningless. Rabbit’s loss—our 
loss—is the protection of a providential sky (“But maybe as a kid he 
walked under a protection that has now been lifted . . . [p. 274]). 
His gain is freedom from a doctrine of grace that requires belief in 
damnation (a la Kruppenbach, the Angstrom family pastor2) in order 
to ensure its own expediency. Recall Updike’s introductory use of 
Pascal (pensee 507): “The motions of Grace, the hardness of the heart; 
external circumstances” (p. 5). Rabbit, Run appropriates Pascal’s 
insight by documenting the “external circumstances” that inevitably 
link Grace and meanness. To the extent that Rabbit believes in God, 
he mistreats Janice. He must overcome his “hardness of the heart” by 
giving up his sugar daddy religion.
A theological question of interest is whether the critique of naive 
religious escapism must necessarily lead to a rejection of everything 
religious. Does the death of the pilgrim God, a God of cosmic 
morality, signal the end of every religious interpretation of reality? 
Here the work of Paul Ricoeur can be of some benefit. Ricoeur gives 
full assent to the critical loss of the immediacy of belief (what he calls 
first naivete).3 Criticism—from Kant’s critical philosophy to our 
everyday intellectual integrity—has proven overwhelming for both 
the precritical, naive believer and for Pascal’s wagering soul. The 
urgency of the Pascalian wager for belief in God over against 
intellectual doubt has disappeared (or become suspect).4 Doubt, or 
suspicion, won the day handily. One need only recall Freud’s sum­
mons for a science of humanity to replace religious illusion to see that 
as the case. Ricoeur, however, proposes a new wager that extends 
beyond criticism: one that can serve a secular or postreligious world.
Before I proceed with a discussion of Ricoeur’s wager, tying it 
specifically to his understanding of atheism, let me say something 
about my intention for this essay. As I said, I want to present Rabbit, 
Run as an allegory of the death of God. Prior to that, however, I hope 
to suggest that the God who dies is of a specific kind or nature. In that 
regard, I will be following Ricoeur in both his appropriation and 
criticism of atheism. There are hidden misunderstandings in atheism 
that, once critiqued, can lead to the possibility of a postreligious faith
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(the second naivete). What I intend, in a nutshell, is that Ricoeur cast 
a shadow of hope over Updike, and that Updike bring life to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics. And who knows, Eccles may reappear in the next 
Rabbit book . . . perhaps in a new capacity.
A Postreligious Faith?
Man acts as though he were the shaper and master o f language, while in fact
language remains the master o f man. Perhaps it is before all else man’s subversion
of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation.
—Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”5
In “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,”6 Ricoeur conducts a philosoph­
ical investigation into the religious meaning of atheism. The essay is 
divided into two parts, dealing in turn with the themes of accusation 
and consolation. These themes, according to Ricoeur, represent the 
two main aspects of religion. He understands religion as a primitive 
structure of life grounded in the fear of punishment (accusation) and 
the desire for protection (consolation). In that this primitive structure 
needs to be overcome by a more genuine faith, atheism is a justifiable 
critique of religion. But hidden in its destructive purpose is also 
liberation—an opening to a faith situated beyond punishment and 
protection.
For Ricoeur, atheism means primarily the atheism of Nietzsche and 
Freud. Through analysis of human consciousness, they both un ­
masked and deciphered the illusions of religion. Their exegesis was 
accompanied by genealogical investigations that revealed the empty 
source of religious and ethical values. Among others, fear and desire 
were found to be instincts behind their production. Hence the 
conclusion that the concepts of good and evil have been created by 
means of projection within a situation of weakness (Nietzsche’s slave 
morality) and dependency (Freud’s yearning for the father).
Nietzsche’s atheism in particular is mostly an attack on the accusa­
tion that characterizes the God of morality. For Ricoeur, that means 
atheism is left at an inconclusive point. The question that remains 
open is what sort of affirmation of life can follow atheism? Atheism 
not only says something about God—what God is not—it also says 
something about human beings. While it cannot be positive in its 
theology, it can and must become positive in its anthropology. The 
gist of Ricoeur’s argument is that atheism is as naive in its anthropol­
ogy as religion was in its theology. Thus the move to a more 
sophisticated reading of human experience is a move beyond the 
nihilistic legacy of atheism to the possibility of postreligious faith, or 
love of life.
Ricoeur exposes the naivete of Nietzsche and Freud by following 
Heidegger and others in the turn to hermeneutics or, more generally,
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to language. In order to escape the alienating features of suspicion 
and mistrust that characterize atheism, a basic philosophical shift is 
made. The shift is away from a Cartesian metaphysics wherein 
self-reflective consciousness assumes that it is the presuppositionless 
starting point for human self-understanding. If the cogito is allowed to 
stand as the willful center from which human consciousness consti­
tutes itself and all meanings and values, then Nietzsche’s and Freud’s 
suspicions are correct. But Ricoeur asks if there is such a thing as a 
presuppositionless philosophy. We come to consciousness already 
using a language; that fact ought to be significant. It is possible, 
argues Ricoeur, to get behind the crippling notion of a theory of 
values—how do values originate in consciousness?—by listening or 
harkening after a “W ord” that is not at our disposition or command. 
By giving up sovereign consciousness’s projects of the will (e.g., 
Nietzsche’s will to power), we can rediscover an original ethical 
situation—a desire to be, a love of life—in the world of discourse that 
discloses life’s possibilities.
Ricoeur practices a philosophy with presuppositions, which means 
he acknowledges the priority of language, and especially symbols, in 
the project of self-understanding. If we allow the power of words to 
inform us about our belonging to the world, we will be able to leave 
behind the cravings for protection and certainty that characterize the 
old moral vision. Beyond Providence and theodicy is another oppor­
tunity to be informed by our religious confessions. Of course we can 
no longer believe the religious confessions first hand because they are 
cast in the form of myth. Criticism has debunked the logic or scientific 
value of myth forever. But criticism has not, Ricoeur argues, discred­
ited the symbolic power of myth. It is the religious symbols that can 
still speak to us of the sacred.
Symbolic discourse corresponds to the most primordial human 
experience, according to Ricoeur. There is no reality that we could be 
conscious of as prior to the reality presented in symbolic discourse: 
again, we come to consciousness already within a symbolic world. The 
symbol gives rise to all of our thinking and imagining, rooting us to 
our language world and to life. The most interesting implication of 
this insight into the priority of the symbol, and its function in 
constituting our very thoughts, is that our relations to the world (and 
ourselves) are always interpretive. There is no way out of a use of 
symbols, or a particular interpretation of the whole world. In order to 
understand, we must interpret. The desire for a presuppositionless 
philosophy must give way to a hermeneutics that already finds itself in 
the midst of beliefs that stem from particular symbols rooted in life. 
Acknowledging this situation, Ricoeur wagers on believing once
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again. He does not wager on the naive belief that subcribes to the 
reality of myths, but on the symbolic power of the Christian myths to 
lead us back to life itself. What Ricoeur actually bets on is a higher 
return in understanding by taking the path of belief. The second 
naivete, beyond criticism by way of criticism, is a re-enactment of 
belief in the hope of better understanding, or of being reimmersed in 
a love of life and creation.
In other words, a postreligious faith, beyond atheism by way of 
atheism, listens once again for a sacred call, believing that the 
possibilities of life are best disclosed in religious symbols that already 
root us in life, and evoke our deepest desires.
Rethinking the Eden Story 
Prior to the Enlightenment, it made little sense to speak of distinctive 
theologies and anthropologies. Theology reigned supreme, its por­
trayals of humanity unimpeachable. Since the Enlightenment, how­
ever, that has not been the case. The rise of anthropology as an 
independent science has often signalled the demise of theology. As 
matters now stand, theology requires the legitimation of anthropol­
ogy. Hence Ricoeur’s study of atheism as anthropology in his move to 
a postreligious faith: he discovers and overcomes atheism’s alienating 
and naive features by proposing a new, more sophisticated anthro­
pology. He does not appeal to theology in his critique, undertaking an 
apologetics; instead, the new anthropology opens the door for 
postreligious theology. Ricoeur appears to follow this simple credo: 
where the anthropology leads, the theology must follow. This formula 
will prove helpful as I return to Rabbit, Run.
In an effort to make use of Ricoeur’s (Eliade’s, Jung’s) insight that 
we never escape or transcend symbolic discourse, I interpret Rabbit, 
Run as a return to Eden. The Garden of Eden myth contains some of 
our most powerful and significant symbols. What better place for a 
battle against heaven? Eden is the original scene of earthly habitation, 
the spot where naivete was first lost. Death is the hard lesson of Eden, 
and personal responsibility. Also, a certain type of God died at Eden: 
never again would we believe that God ordinarily walks the earth as an 
embodied person. In order to overcome the God of cosmic morality, 
a return to Eden is necessary. To the extent that I demonstrate 
Rabbit’s figurative revisitation of Eden, I will have presented Rabbit, 
Run as an allegory of the death of God.
Like Adam and Eve, Harry and Janice eventually have two children, 
one of whom dies prematurely. Adam and Eve’s children came after 
expulsion from the Garden, whereas Harry, at least, reenters Eden in 
the sexual act. The instinct for procreation transports him back to the
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original creation, to the edge of paradise, and innocence. The 
zoological tenor of Updike’s metaphors, most notably Harry’s “Rab­
bit” nickname, suggests this return to instinctive innocence. Eden was 
the place of equality, or near equality, between humans and animals. 
Harry’s “anthropology” is his body, his animal heritage, and by 
following its lead he reconnects with creation—its simple aliveness. 
Accompanying his innocent anthropology, Rabbit’s theology also has 
a pristine, gushy quality. “I love it, I love it,” Harry exclaims. “Palm 
Sunday is always blue. It makes the sap rise in my legs” (p. 96). There 
are no apples or snakes in this new Garden. Rather, the temptations 
are reversed: God, it would seem, has the opportunity to do some­
thing when baby Rebecca is drowning in the bathtub. God does 
nothing. This time around God is unable to sustain the Garden as a 
naive paradise. Unlike the original couple, Rabbit must learn to expel 
himself from Eden. How? By accepting responsibility for his family, 
and by fighting Providence as he fights “meanness of heart.” While 
Providence was a real part of the old Garden, it has no place in the 
new one.
The text of Rabbit, Run can be broken into three parts according to 
the scenario outlined above. Part one is Rabbit’s “run” for life, or his 
return to Eden; part two is his tragic attempt to sustain a life in 
paradise, building up to a showdown with God; and part three is his 
run away from Eden, especially the self-understanding and God he 
decides to leave there. In pagination, the three parts of my interpre­
tation more or less correspond to Updike’s own partitions.
In part one Rabbit seizes the chance to escape his fall from fame as 
a former basketball star. The obscurity of being married to Janice 
Springer is stifling. Rabbit wants to have a say in his life and its 
development. It oppresses him that the mere physical appearance of 
another generation is forcing him to grow up.
He stands there thinking, The kids keep coming, they keep crowding you up . . .  .
He doesn’t want this respect, he wants to tell them there’s nothing to getting old,
it takes nothing, (pp. 9, 10)
Rabbit ducks out of the march of generations, abandoning Janice and 
Nelson. He takes a strange, all-night drive. This car trip begins his 
pilgrimage back to Eden (where the marching begins) and his animal 
self.
After his journey, Rabbit’s instincts are sharp. His body sustains his 
newfound state of innocence. Like the old Adam, he needs a com­
panion. We know Rabbit is in Eden when he takes up with Ruth, a 
hooker who lives across from a church and is offended that Harry 
believes in God. He, on the other hand, is offended that she tries to 
prevent getting pregnant. It spoils the childish immediacy that Rabbit
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has attained.
The shift to part two, Rabbit’s tragic attempt to sustain a life in 
paradise, begins in earnest when Eccles arrives on the scene. They 
become fast friends, golf partners actually. In time, Eccles stakes the 
success of his ministry (the Christian Church’s ministry?) on his ability 
to steer Rabbit back to a responsible life with Janice. Rabbit resists 
Eccles’s efforts until Janice has their second child. That is when he 
suddenly recognizes the folly, and possible tragedy, of his fanciful 
search for God and paradise. “He is certain that as a consequence of 
his sin Janice or the baby will die. His sin is a conglomerate of flight, 
cruelty, obscenity, and conceit; a black clot embodied in the entrails of 
the birth” (p. 182). By whatever means one arrives at Eden, no one 
leaves except by sin. Paradise inevitably leads to tragedy. And in 
Rabbit’s Garden, that means it is the search for God that leads 
inevitably to sin.
Rabbit quickly understands that there is no innocent relationship to 
God. His childish, wishful beliefs have linked him to terrible sins. But 
the sin is against Janice, not God. It is because of God that he runs and 
incurs guilt. So Rabbit puts two and two together:
There is no God: Janice can die: the two thoughts come at once, in one slow wave. He 
feels underwater, caught in chains o f transparent slime, ghosts o f the urgent 
ejaculations he has spat into the mild bodies o f women, (p. 184)
Just as having care-free, instinctive sex with Ruth sustained paradise,
Janice’s having their baby suddenly shatters it.
It is one thing for Rabbit to have an insight about there not being a
God, quite another to allow it to shape his life. Finally, in part three,
Rabbit must expel himself from Eden. That proves difficult. Even
though they get back together, Janice and Rabbit fight. When Rabbit
runs to Ruth again, Janice is devastated. She drinks too much and the
baby drowns in the bathtub. Rabbit comes back. The full weight of
Eden rests upon him: the presumption of faith, the harsh reality of
death. But still he tries to cling to his naive faith.
The situation is assessed best by Mr. Tothero, Rabbit’s former
coach. He tells Rabbit that right and wrong are not dropped from the
sky, that we are responsible for ourselves. Here the message of Rabbit,
Run fully connects with the modern legacy that Ricoeur talks about:
naive religion must give way to the critique of atheism, theology to
anthropology. It is Tothero, not Eccles, who is able to deliver the most
revealing message. As Updike tells us, Tothero’s revelation chills
Rabbit. Why? Because “he wants to believe in the sky as the source of
all things” (p. 258). Instinct, luck and time run out for Harry “Rabbit”
Angstrom. When he flees again, for the last time, he is fleeing Eden.
Eccles’s failure to guide Rabbit back to a responsible life with Janice—
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Rabbit makes a pass at Mrs. Eccles!—signals the death of the pilgrim 
God.
Conclusion
Ricoeur’s interpretation of atheism and Rabbit’s pilgrimage pass 
similar milestones. From naive religion and from Eden as a symbol of 
paradise, they move to a more sophisticated understanding of hum an­
ity that spells the death of the God of cosmic morality. In the case of 
Ricoeur, however, there is an additional step. He wants to suggest an 
opening for a new, postreligious faith beyond the naivete of atheism. 
While this further move by Ricoeur probably cannot be matched in 
Rabbit, R un , it can be anticipated there.
The problem with atheism has been its inability to overcome its own 
nihilistic tendencies: in giving up paradise, it also gives up the tree of 
life. That is not the case with Rabbit, Run. As Mrs. Smith tells Rabbit 
when he quits his temporary gardening job,
That’s what you have, Harry: life. It’s a strange gift and I don’t know how we’re
supposed to use it but I know it’s the only gift we get and it’s a good one. (p. 207)
If Eden can no longer represent paradise, it may yet speak as a symbol 
of the gift of life. It is possible that Harry Angstrom, through 
reinterpretation of these events and from the vantage point of a 
second naivete, will hear a call to faith again. Not because he has 
unfulfilled childhood wishes, but because he seeks a better under­
standing of himself.
So how about it, Mr. Updike: where does Eccles disappear to? What 
have you done with him? Is there a role he can still play as Harry and 
Janice approach their old age?
NOTES
1 John Updike, Rabbit, Run (New York: Ballantine Books Edition o f Fawcett Crest 
Edition, 1982 and 1962), 37. (All subsequent references to Rabbit, Run will be indicated 
by page numbers in this edition.)
2 Kruppenbach is the Angstrom family pastor with whom Eccles (the Springer family 
pastor) disputes. “Don’t you believe in damnation?” (p. 158) Kruppenbach asks Eccles 
when the latter tries to discuss a way o f helping Harry and Janice.
3 I refer to “The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought,” the famous concluding chapter of 
The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanon (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
4 I am suggesting that the distance between Pascal and Ricoeur is o f the same 
importance as the distance between Bunyan and Updike. Between the 17th and 20th 
centuries stands the modern experiment.
5 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” trans. Albert Hofstader, Poetry, 
Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 146.
6 Paul Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don 
Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 440-467.
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